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Contingent convertible bonds have emerged as a going-concern loss-absorbing instrument in 
response to the last financial crisis. These hybrids, commenced by the new Basel III 
regulation, might be able to substitute the prevailing subordinated debt instruments that failed 
to effectively absorb losses during the last crisis. Issuing CoCos present an effective way to 
provide automatic recapitalizing for banks in times with financial distress, by forcing 
conversion to shares or automatic write-down when certain triggers are breached. 
Consequently, the instrument enhances robustness of the banking sector if constructed 
properly. 
 
This thesis presents the structure and promising pricing methods of CoCos with Core Equity 
Tier 1 trigger, in which equity derivatives pricing method is found to be the most suitable. As 
the dynamics and structure of the instrument are complex, finding the appropriate trigger is 
not straightforward. Most of the existing models, including equity derivatives, imply high co-
movement between Core Equity Tier 1 and stock prices in order to find the trigger level. 
However, as the historical correlation prove to be insignificant, there is need for new research 
in this field.  
 
This thesis develop an modest attempt at finding the stock price trigger level based on an 
analytical approach using scenario CAPM 𝛽 values. To test the analytical method in an equity 
derivatives approach, CoCo issuances by DNB in 2015 and 2016 are examined. The data is 
retrieved from TITLON financial database and company filings, whereas simple data 
handling is performed in Microsoft Excel. All computations are done in the statistical 
programming software R. The codes are available upon request. According to the best 
estimate, the price of both DNB CoCos are undervalued. As underpricing is apparent, the 
thesis points to several factors that may explain the discrepancy between theoretical and 
observed prices. These consists mainly of (1) mispricing caused by the model, and (2) 
mispricing due to market participants’ perception of CoCos dynamics.   
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1.1 Background   
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 banks became the subject of increased 
regulatory capital requirements. The years prior to the financial crisis was a period with 
overwhelming belief in increased housing prices. As Bailey et al. (2008) point out, the crisis 
was mainly caused by derivatives with higher risk embedded than initially assumed. 
Especially important were collateralized debt obligations, a security with collateral in other 
financial instruments. This derivative was filled with subprime loans and sold as securities-
based mortgage loans, well known as mortgage-backed securities. Due to misleading credit 
ratings and high default risk, these derivatives were devastating for an already overheated 
economy.  
 
The crisis led to severe international financial distress commenced by chain-reactions of large 
interconnected banks, which in turn caused the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the need for 
several rescue packages for banks around the world. These bailouts were, of course, financed 
by the taxpayers’ money. Thus, the failure of existing debt instruments to absorb losses 
effectively was revealed. Seniority of prevailing hybrids and subordinated debt was structured 
so that these instruments suffer losses second after equity when default occurs. Therefore 
protecting the more senior capital sources, such as deposits. However, since these prevailing 
hybrids are gone-concern loss absorbing, as they face losses only when default occurs, 
regulators also bailed out investors in such debt securities using tax-payers’ money. This 
obviously attracted strong criticism. 
 
Subsequently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) proposed Basel III as a response 
to future crises, with a goal to increase the amount and quality of regulatory capital (BCBS, 
2010). In light of new financial regulation, the issuance of a new instrument called a 
contingent convertible bond (CoCos) was facilitated, hereby providing a hybrid instrument 
with going-concern loss-absorbing properties. CoCos first entered the market one year after 




CoCos are by definition hybrid instruments issued by financial institutions, where automatic 
conversion to shares or a write-down occur based on predefined contractual conditions 
(Corcuera et al., 2013). These conditions include one or several triggers related to the 
instrument, and are supposed to reflect a situation in which the issuing company needs 
restored capital. When a trigger is breached, automatic contingent conversion or write-down 
instigates recapitalization of the bank.  
 
Because CoCos are intended to be a true loss-absorbing instrument, they might reduce default 
risk and vulnerability for banks in times of financial distress. Furthermore, by allowing CoCo 
issuance, the Bank for International Settlements are able to mitigate crises and stop taxpayers 
from becoming the loss-absorbing part in the future. This means that default risk is transferred 
from taxpayers to CoCo investors, reducing the need for future regulatory initiated bailouts. 
CoCos might also function as countercyclical capital if constructed properly. Liebenberg et al. 
(2017) state that this might reduce the procyclical nature of the economy. However, this 
requires that investors in CoCos are not mainly other banks, so that the too-big-to-fail issue 
observed in the last crisis is reduced. 
 
Although CoCos are bonds with conversion and fixed income properties, they must not be 
confused with regular convertible bonds, as they differ widely in structure. Regular 
convertible bonds give bondholders the option of exchanging bonds into shares in the 
company (Bodie et al., 2014), while contingent convertible bonds have automatic conversion 
based on certain trigger levels. As regular convertible bonds have equity upside, conversion of 
CoCos imposes a direct loss onto the investor. Hence, the structure of the two is quite 
different.    
 
The performance of CoCos as a loss-absorbing instrument is however rather untested. To 
date, few events involving conversion or write-down have occurred, leaving questions about 
CoCos long-term suitability unanswered. However, two recent events involving CoCos add to 
the discussion of its assessment as regulatory capital. These are presented later in the 
regulatory debate provided throughout the discussion of this thesis.  
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1.2 Motivation and Purpose 
 
There exist a variety of CoCo structures, which are mainly differentiated by trigger and 
conversion properties. As these features are designed to ensure the loss absorbing ability, 
Corcuera et al. (2013) emphasize the importance of constantly searching for new methods to 
price and explore their dynamics. To qualify as regulatory capital under Basel III, CoCos 
should function as a direct loss-absorbing instrument restoring the core capital when a bank 
faces trouble. However, the discussion of evaluating the suitability as hybrid regulatory 
capital is an ongoing debate and Admati et al. (2013), among others, criticizes the instrument 
for being too complex and likely having insufficient loss-absorbing capacity.  
 
Most issuances have a Core Equity Tier 1 trigger level, which implies that conversion to 
shares or write-down occur when this trigger level is breached. As CoCos are complex 
instruments with automatic conversion based on these lagging accounting trigger ratios, 
pricing them becomes challenging. Much of existing literature assumes that stock price can 
replace the CET1 trigger, thus assuming a one-on-one relationship, making pricing more 
straightforward since stock prices are observable. However, the correlation between stock 
price and CET1 trigger is found to be insignificant, as outlined in Section 6, highlighting the 
need to obtain a more realistic trigger relation. 
 
Without the ability to price CoCos correctly, the bank as the issuer, and the investor as the 
buyer, are faced with decisions of high uncertainty. This uncertainty highlights the importance 
of constantly searching for optimal structure and pricing methods regarding the instrument. 
From these reflections, the following research questions are formulated:  
 
RQ1: How suitable are CoCos as an instrument for meeting increased regulatory capital 
requirements? 
RQ2: What is the fair price of DNBs CoCo issuances? Moreover, how do one model the 




This thesis seeks to address the regulatory debate by exploring RQ1 with a foothold in 
prevailing academia and regulatory statements. CoCos are however empirically untested as 
loss-absorbing instruments, making the approach ex ante. Thus, implementation of Basel III 
and the defining aspects of CoCo are especially emphasized in the beginning of the thesis. As 
Basel III serves as a backdrop for CoCo issuance, it is important to gain knowledge of the 
relationship between the two. Both Section 2 and 3 seek to present the relevant structure and 
features which are necessary to further address the ex-ante question of suitability. Since 
CoCos are issued by banks, this thesis includes theory and models applicable to financial 
institutions. Theory which is relevant to understand the effects of banks’ lending practices in 
the real economy is thus also briefly reviewed.  
 
This thesis contributes to the literature of pricing CoCos, as stated in RQ2, by employing the 
equity derivatives method proposed by Spiegeleer et al. (2017) on Norwegian CoCos. The 
most prominent existing methods are presented in Section 4 and evaluated based on 
applicability and their underlying assumptions. Later, the equity derivatives method is applied 
to actual issuances by DNB, seeking to obtain the fair price of these CoCo bonds and 
comparing them to observed market values. Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature by 
exploring a new 𝛽 approach to find the stock price trigger level, rather than assuming fixed 
historic correlation. To evaluate the robustness of the pricing model, a sensitivity analysis and 
discussion of the results are presented. 
 
Section 2 discusses financial regulation with focus on new implementation of capital 
requirement under Basel III. An understanding of this regulation is essential to evaluate the 
usefulness and loss absorbing properties of CoCos. In Section 3, literature regarding the 
structure, features, issuing and risk profile of CoCos are presented, with emphasis on 
academic work that addresses the loss-absorbing properties of the instrument. Various pricing 
methods are also presented and discussed in Section 4, before our own contributions for 
empirical pricing is presented in Section 5. Section 6 implement the chosen pricing 
methodology, while Section 7 provides discussion on and sensitivity analysis of the results. 







2.1 Basel III 
 
As a direct result of the missing ability to provide necessary loss-absorbing banks under the 
Basel II regime, a new and enhanced version was proposed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010). The new Basel III framework aims at creating more 
robust banks for times of financial distress, through increased quantity and quality of 
regulatory capital. The embedded capital requirements are perceived as the building blocks of 
a stable financial system with greater ability to withstand future financial crises, and seek to 
lower the probability of defaults. Basel III also introduces new regulations with regard to 
liquidity, risk management, supervision and surveillance, in addition to market discipline 
through 3 different pillars (BCBS, 2013a). The capital requirements are considered mainly in 
pillar 1, which is the basis for this thesis.  
 
BCBS (2010) wanted to reduce the procyclicality in markets at the same time as capital 
buffers were introduced. From their view, a crucial factor is that banks act as shock-
absorbing, rather than transferring shocks to the financial system and real economy. Also, 
banks are perceived as the actual foundation for sustainable economic growth, since they 
channel savings into productive investments. Based on this reasoning, the buffer for capital 
conservation (CCB) and the countercyclical buffer capital was introduced. These 
requirements are under gradual phase-in for the membership countries of Basel III and are 
planned to be fully implemented by January 2019 (BCBS, 2013).  
 
The countercyclical buffer was introduced to mitigate the effect of decreasing economic 
conditions, with the purpose of protecting the financial industry at times with exaggerated 
credit growth (BCBS, 2010). By proposing such a buffer, the bank can gain capital reserves in 
times when systematic risk is increasing. Here the systematic risk is the probability that a 
single bankruptcy trigger disturbance and financial distress, often referred to as too-big-to-fail 




To prevent too-big-to-fail risk, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced 
specific requirements for banks with influential positions in the world economy. These are 
assumed to be systematically important financial institutions, often denoted SIFIs (BCBS, 
2013a). SIFIs are required to maintain an extra high level of Core Equity Tier 1 capital. The 
transitional period from Basel II to Basel III is attained through withholding profits and 
obtaining new capital. While at the same time, banks’ function in term of lending across the 
economy to sustain growth (BCBS, 2010). 
 
The Basel Committee distinguishes between Tier 1 and Tier 2 by defining Tier 1 as capital 
with on-going concern, while Tier 2 is gone-concern capital (BCBS, 2010). Moreover, the 
instruments that previously were allowed under Basel II but no longer fit the description of 
Tier 1 or Tier 2, are phased out over a 10-year period starting from January 2013 (BCBS, 
2013). Prior to the financial crisis, innovative Tier 1 instruments were used by banks to 
generate Tier 1 capital. Subsequently, BCBS imposed stricter requirements on these. 
 
 2.2 Capital Requirements  
 
Total regulatory capital is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2, where Tier 1 is divided into CET1 and 
Additional Tier 1 (AT1). For each of these categories there exists a unique set of specified 
criteria, where all criteria must be fulfilled in order to qualify as regulatory capital. The full 
list of criteria are found in BCBS (2010). 
 
According to BCBS (2010), Core Equity Tier 1 is capital with the highest level of quality in 
the bank capital structure. Thus, consisting of withheld own capital and ordinary shares, this 
form of capital is supposed to absorb losses first. As introduced by BCBS (2010), the CET1 
capital level must at all times be minimum 4.5 percent of risk-weighted assets (RWA). Here 
the RWA capture individual banks’ exposure to risk, through weighting assets of the bank in 
accordance with risk embedded. The calculation for CET1 capital ratio is clarified from Basel 




𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑅𝑊𝐴
                                                 (1) 
 
Intuitively, Equation (1) shows that the bank is able to restore its CET1 capital ratio by 
increasing the level of capital qualified as CET1, reduce RWA or a combination of both 
measures. Figure 1 easily illustrates the different requirements and associated levels in the 
percentage of RWA. Where the sum of CET1 capital and AT1 must be a minimum 6 percent 
of RWA and total regulatory minimum capital is 8 percent. The requirement regarding 
conservation buffer is 2.5 percent, while countercyclical buffer capital is 0-2.5 percent, 
depending on the level of systematic risk embedded in the economy. For systematically 
important financial institutions, the additional 1-3.5 percent SIFI surcharge is required in 
accordance with their CET1 capital (BCBS, 2013a). As outlined in depth through Sections 3.4 
and 3.5, CoCos might be eligible for Tier 1 or Tier 2, depending on its structure. 
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Contingent Convertible Bonds 
 
After the initial CoCo issuance of £7 billion by Lloyds in 2009, the market for contingent 
convertible bonds has grown significantly. Avdjiev et al. (2017) show that in late 2015 CoCos 
totaling $521 billion is issued through 730 instruments. The distribution of issuance by 
nationality and currency is provided in figure A.1 from appendices, showing that China and 
UK are the biggest contributors. Supported by the fact that CHY, EUR and USD are the 
dominating currencies.  
 
Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) highlight that about 65 percent of the world’s issuances is made 
within the European Economic Region (EEA), caused by the fact that CoCos is addressed 
different regulatory tax treatment between regions. Thus, Tier 1 CoCos are treated as own 
capital by regulators, and as debt from a taxation point of view in the EEA. Hence this asset 
class is favorable due to tax deductions. In other regions CoCos are not tax deductible, which 
explains the lack of interest in this asset class in other places, such as the USA.  
 
Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) underscore that Tier 2 capital is treated as debt from both 
regulatory and tax points of view, which explains why about 70 percent of all CoCos are 
issued as Tier 1. However, as shown from Figure B.1 in appendices, there has been a recent 
shift toward more equal issuances between Tier 1 and Tier 2. Sundaresan & Wang (2010) 
highlight the important point that a banks’ saved tax deductions is a cost for the taxpayers of 
the society. Thus, making room for discussion between policymakers and regulators of the 
features and structure of CoCos. 
 
Flannery (2002) was the first to introduce a specific instrument with automatic reversal of 
capital ratio for times with financial distress. The instrument was named reverse convertible 
debentures, but is essentially the same as CoCos. Flannery (2002) highlights several aspects 
that make the instrument capable of restoring capital ratios efficiently. Among these are loss-
absorbing effects through automatic recapitalizing, reduced default risk for shareholders, 





Based on a Flannery (2002) framework, several contributors aim to further develop the 
structure for CoCos. Among the contributors are Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011), Sundaresan 
& Wang (2010), French et al. (2010) and Corcuera et al. (2013). These contributions are 
furthermore presented as the next subsections thoroughly review CoCos important structure 
and features.  
 
3.1 Loss-Absorbing Properties 
 
The most important purpose of a CoCo bond is to function as a loss-absorbing instrument. In 
times of financial decrease and increased distress, the propensity to lend money to banks is 
assumed to be low. Liebenberg et al. (2017) highlight that this effect was largely observed 
during the last financial crisis. Thus, the credit models incorporated increased volatility in the 
financial sector as a sign of high credit risk, causing problems for banks. The credit models 
are often referred to as procyclical, due to their self-reinforcing effect. This resulted in banks 
having problems financing its lending services, which in turn had a negative effect on the 
entire global economy. 
 
Haas & Horen (2012) conclude that the procyclical effect during the last financial crisis was 
decisive on the real economy. This occurred since globally systematic important banks (G-
SIBs) considerably decreased their lending across nations. These banks had to decrease 
lending due to impairment of subprime assets, need for refinancing large amount of long-term 
debt in illiquid markets, and due to large fall in market-to-book ratios. Clearly, this caused 
direct manifestations in lending across nations, where the economic downturn was reinforced.  
 
Flannery (2002) argues that if a SIFI is in danger of going bankrupt, the government have all 
the incentives to save the institution by providing bailouts, rather than taking the social costs 
embedded with bankruptcy. Zombirt (2015) expresses that if CoCos loss-absorbing 
mechanism work as intended, the risk is transferred from taxpayers to debt-owners in 
economically stressed situations. This coincides with the intention of the Basel Committee of 
Banking on Banking Supervision when Basel III was designed. CoCos are thus reducing 
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capital drought since the default risk is decreased. Consequently, companies issuing CoCos 
might be able to automatically restore its capital ratio in accordance to their chosen trigger 
and conversion method.  
 
3.2 Conversion  
 
Conversion of CoCos occurs when a given trigger level is breached, and since conversion is 
contingent it cannot be stopped by any parts when first initiated. The conversion type is 
predefined and might be structured in one of two following ways: 
1. Conversion to equity 
2. Principal write-down  
 
The loss-absorbing mechanism through conversion or write-down is of great structural 
importance. Zombirt (2015) underscores conversion method as crucial in terms of the 
deciding incentives of the investors. Where in general, being faced with conversion to equity 
risk is preferable from the investor’s point of view. Hence, investing in CoCos with 
conversion to equity requires a lower risk premium. However, problems arise since 
institutional investors often do not have the mandates to invest directly in stocks, these 
investors must therefore focus on CoCos with write-down mechanisms that commands higher 
risk premiums.  
 
The time for conversion is aimed at reflecting a situation where the bank is in distress, and 
where the banks’ debt owners, depositors and regulatory authorities start to doubt the future of 
the company (Corcuera et al., 2013). As a result of automatic conversion, the capital ratio 
might be restored before it is too late. This prevents the need to summon extraordinary 
general meetings and gather new capital under difficult market conditions, which contributes 






3.2.1 Fraction and Price 
 
In addition to conversion type, i.e. conversion to equity or write-down, the conversion fraction 
and conversion price are essential (Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011). The conversion fraction 
dictates the degree of face value that is converted or written down. The value converted or 
written down is specified as 𝛼𝑁, where 𝛼 is the predefined fraction. If 𝛼 = 1, the entire face 
value is converted.  
 
The conversion price 𝐶𝑝, has a big impact on the payoff for CoCo investors when faced with 
conversion. Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) argue that CoCo investors profits from low 
conversion price, since it yields a higher amount of shares when conversion is a fact. In 
general, the conversion price is given by Equation (2) where 𝐶𝑟 denotes the conversion ratio, 





                                                                    (2) 
 
The conversion price can be structured in three different ways. Firstly, conversion price might 
be set as equal to 𝑆∗, i.e. the observed price at the trigger point. Alternatively, conversion 
price can be expressed as equal to stock price at the time of issuance. Finally, a conversion 
price with a floor can be defined. The latter is basically conversion price equal to stock price 
at the trigger point, but with a floor that prevents the conversion price to fall under a threshold 
even when trigger price is at a lower point (Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011). In practice, all 
three conversion price mechanisms are observed in the market.  
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) express that the main difference between the abovementioned 
structures is that the first induce high dilution for existing shareholders. The second structure, 
setting conversion price equal to the price on issuance, is going somewhat in the opposite 
direction, generally yielding a lower degree of dilution. The price with the floor is defined as 





Flannery (2002) argues that CoCos are a more suitable regulatory financial instrument than 
conventional bonds, e.g. plain convertible bonds. However, the structure and dynamics of the 
two securities are widely different. The only commonalities are that both have a built-in 
mechanisms for conversion and a coupon rate. Previously, a well-known death-spiral-effect 
has been observed for investments in regular convertible bonds (French et al., 2010). This 
effect is driven by market manipulation, e.g. when a big market participant short-selling a 
stock while simultaneously owning convertible bonds on the company (Flannery, 2002). The 
bond is converted when the price is falling, so that large profits potentially can be gained over 
time. CoCos eliminate the death-spiral-effect due to automatic conversion and predefined 
contingent trigger levels. Both Flannery (2002) and Sundaresan & Wang (2010) argues that 
this makes CoCos more attractive with regard to mitigating financial distress, since the 
incentive for market manipulation is removed.    
 
3.3 Trigger Mechanisms  
 
Sundaresan & Wang (2010) and Corcuera et al. (2013) highlight the importance of structuring 
the trigger mechanism properly. Indeed, this is the most important aspect regarding the CoCo 
structure, as it shall ensure conversion for necessary situations.  
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) propose several critical factors in the design of trigger 
features, all of which ideally should be present. 
1. Clarity: The trigger must be designed in such a way that it sends the same signal 
independent of jurisdiction. Also, different standards cannot be used to measure the 
same concept, e.g. CET1 ratio.  
2. Objectivity: The process for conversion into shares must be known at issue date. 
Therefore, the prospectus need to be carefully designed. Since the conversion process 
must be known, it is suboptimal to have external intervention from regulatory forces. 
3. Transparent: The level of the trigger must be easily observable, so that everyone has 
perfect information. Optimally, the trigger level should be observed with daily 
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changes, similarly to stocks. Using CET1 capital ratio is thus not optimal since it is 
based on quarterly accounting measures, with lack of detail.  
4. Fixed: The trigger must be constant and not be changed during the lifetime of the 
instrument. 
5. Public: All the information regarding structure and drivers behind a potential 
conversion must be public information.  
6. Update frequency: The trigger should be updated sufficiently often, so that investors 
continuously are able to assess price and risk embedded with the instrument.  
In total there are four different trigger mechanisms, namely: Accounting triggers, market-
based triggers, multivariable triggers and regulatory triggers. These trigger types will be 
discussed in the next subsections.  
 
3.3.1 Accounting   
 
Liebenberg et al. (2017) show that the majority of CoCo issuances have accounting CET1 
triggers. The purpose of the accounting trigger is that the issuing bank restores its capital ratio 
when the relation between Core Equity Tier 1 capital and RWA falls below a prespecified 
level. When a CoCo converts to shares, an increase in CET1 capital occurs, which further 
increases the bank’s CET1 ratio given a constant level of RWA. However, a very important 
feature is that conversion must happen before the bank is facing financing trouble (Liebenberg 
et al., 2017).  
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) problematize that the accounting trigger might be triggered 
long after it is needed since it is a lagged indicator. Hence, the accounting indicator looks 
backward in time, rather than forward. Causing investors to operate blindfolded for large parts 
of the year. The main argument for this statement is found by looking at large financial 
institutions that went bankrupt or needed bail-outs in 2008. Among these were Bear Sterns, 
Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and Merrill Lynch. Common for all was that they reported 
regulatory capital well above the minimum level of 8 percent before bankruptcy and rescue 




When Banco Popular needed to be rescued in 2017, it can be argued that the situation was 
similar to when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in 2008 (Euromoney, 2017). The Banco 
Popular incident is presented in Section 7.3 and it highlights the problem of the accounting 
trigger regards to update frequency. In addition, the accounting trigger might be subject to 
manipulation in form of creative accounting or increased focus toward low-risk assets (French 
et al., 2010).  
 
3.3.2 Market Based 
 
CoCos with market based trigger place the conversion contingency equal to stock price. 
Sundaresan & Wang (2010) explored this trigger form thoroughly and conclude that it 
generally do not lead to a unique equilibrium. CoCos with market triggers might induce 
instability due to an asymmetric payoff structure. Thus, conversion is punitive for existing 
shareholders since they face dilution. The existence of multiple equilibriums causes different 
incentives for shareholders and CoCo investors as shareholders want to increase stock price 
while CoCo owners want to decrease it.  
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) also argue that market triggers make conversion based on 
manipulation more likely. For instance, a trigger level might be breached by a large short-
selling on a day with low volume. Although there are problems embedded in market triggers, 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) highlight that they are preferred in the academic world. This is 
because market based triggers are to a larger extent forward looking, since they are not based 




The suggestion from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to use debt instruments 
with loss-absorbing features in form of write down or conversion, is highly related to 
regulatory triggers (Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011). The action of a regulatory authority 
providing rescue packages to mitigate default can be replaced by such a trigger. Conversion is 
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thus necessary when the bank loses trust from owners, depositors and government authorities. 
However, CoCos with a regulatory trigger might be less attractive to investors.  
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) underscore that investors do not like the idea of conversion 
purely based on regulatory perspectives since this gives the authorities too much power. This 
can cause difficulties related to pricing, since quantifying the expected behavior of regulatory 
authorities might be impossible. Sundaresan & Wang (2010) also address lack of sufficient 
information, ineffective surveillance and political pressure as aspects that further increase 
problems with regulatory triggers. 
 
3.3.4 Multivariable  
 
By increasing the dimension in conversion contingency, The Squam Lake Working group on 
Financial Regulation proposes the use of both macro and micro triggers combined (French et 
al., 2010). Their suggestion embraces both the use of regulatory status and specific company 
measure. The idea behind The Squam Lake Working group’s proposition is two-folded: first 
the regulatory authorities must declare economic distress, then the predefined threshold is 
breached, before CoCos face conversion. The former is the associated macro trigger and the 
latter is the micro trigger.  
 
French et al. (2010) emphasize that this two-folded approach removes the problem of a single 
systematic trigger. If the single systematic trigger is used, the bank might change incentives 
about healthy operation since they know authorities will provide bailouts if necessary. French 
et al. (2010) argue that multivariable triggers have a disciplinary effect of management, as 
well as removing the political pressure towards declaring economic distress. The following 
solution is that banks with capital issues become re-capitalized in times when the whole 
economy is vulnerable. The proposition of multivariable triggers is close to reality. Thus, a 





3.4 Basel III Criteria  
 
BCBS (2010) allows for issuance of CoCos through the criteria for AT1 and Tier 2. Features 
embedded by the instrument are crucial for deciding its category. The following selected 
criteria are especially important:  
1. Lifetime of the instrument 
2. Loss-absorbing properties  
3. Option to call the instrument 
4. Trigger level  
5. Distribution of coupon payments 
 
For CoCos to accrue the category of AT1 they have to be perpetual, meaning that they cannot 
have a specified maturity date. Also, the necessary loss absorbing-properties must be fulfilled 
through predefined mechanisms of triggers and conversion. Furthermore, for AT1 CoCos 
there is the possibility to call the instrument after 5 years from the issuing date, and its trigger 
level must be minimum 5.125 per-cent of RWA. Thus, the call option gives the issuer the 
opportunity to buy back the bonds after 5 years (BCBS, 2010). 
 
For Tier 2 CoCos, the instrument must have at least 5 years’ maturity and the possibility for 
call after this minimum lifetime (BCBS, 2010). Another factor differencing AT1 and Tier 2, is 
that coupons of AT1 bonds are at the sole discretion of the issuer. This means that AT1 bonds 
might face coupon cancellation without forcing conversion. For Tier 2, coupon cancellation 
occurs only when conversion is a fact. Due to this non-cumulative distribution of coupon 
payments for AT1 bonds, a coupon cancellation risk is introduced, as extensively covered by 
Spiegeleer et al. (2017).  
 
3.5 CoCo Implementation 
 
Capital Requirements Directive no. 4 (CRD IV) and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 
form the framework for implementation of CoCos in coordination with Basel III. These are 
regulations and directives ongoing from January 2013. CRD IV compromises legislation that 
is brought to light through national law, while CRR are regulations that are ongoing for 
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companies across the EU (Cahn & Kenadjian, 2014). Basel III also specifies that every 
member-nation can introduce additional provisions and faster implementation than the 
original framework presented (BCBS, 2010). 
 
The combination of CRD IV, CRR and Basel III provides the framework that decides a 
bank’s opportunity to issue CoCos. Figure 2 shows that the maximum issuance allowed is 
limited to 3.5 percent, divided into AT1 and Tier 2. Avdjiev et al. (2013) show that typically 
AT1 CoCos have CET1 trigger ratios of 5.125 percent of RWA, while Tier 2 typically is 
around 7-8 percent. Intuitively it is easy to understand that for high-trigger CoCos, probability 
of breaching the CET1 ratio is higher, which cause higher coupon rates to investors. The 
opposite is true for low triggers. Consequently, both Zombirt (2015) and Avdjiev et al. (2015) 
points to the fact that low trigger has little regulatory value since conversion occurs later.  
 
   ≥8% RWA 
  Tier 2 (T2)   
  Non-CoCo subordinated debt   
      
  T2 CoCo   
    ≥6% RWA 
  Additional Tier 1 (AT1)   
  Preferred shares   
  AT1 CoCo   
    ≥4.5% RWA 
  Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)   
      
  Common shares   
      
  Retained earnings   
      
      
      
  Bank capital structure   
 
Figure 2: Bank capital structure and CoCo implementation.  
 
Avdjiev et al. (2013) emphasize that CoCo ownership must be distributed in such way that 
total systematic risk is reduced, not just moving concentration of risk between different 
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companies. This is one explanation for why SIFIs are prohibited from issuing CoCos as a 
source of additional capital (Zombirt, 2015). The interconnectedness of these large financial 
institutions simply imposes too much risk. However, this has caused debate since it is 
important for the real economy to have robust systematic important financial institutions.  
 
Admati et al. (2013) are among the sceptics who emphasize that CoCos are too complex and 
are likely to have insufficient loss-absorbing capacity. From their view, issuing common 
equity would be least as good. Consequently, Admati et al. (2013) state that tax deductions 
achieved by issuing CoCos are a cost to society, and therefore common equity is more 
advantageous. Also they underscore that debt-overhang-effect causes negative impact, since 
high levels of debt might lead to underinvestment. This may in turn lead to disrupted lending 
and investment decisions for otherwise profitable projects. 
 
Goncharenko & Rauf (2016) show that CoCo issuance is used by banks to maximize return on 
equity (ROE). This is especially true for banks that must adopt increased regulatory 
requirements and for those who are faced with low risk. Moreover, issuing CoCos is less 
costly than collecting new money at the market, since the banks are imposed with reserve 
capital provisions (Goncharenko & Rauf, 2016). Hence, issuing CoCos appear as attractive 
for many banks, as well as a cheap alternative for banks with low risk.  
  
3.6 Risk Profile 
 
CoCos are so-called over-the-counter (OTC) instruments. Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) 
compares the risk profile of CoCos with insurance contracts. Investors in such hybrid 
instruments expose themselves to limited profits and unlimited downside, thus investing in 
CoCos provides low probability of loss and high probability of moderate returns.  
 
Delivorias (2016) highlights the complexity and uncertainty of coupon payments as the main 
factors that credit bureaus have difficulties with regarding CoCos. Typically the instrument 
achieve credit ratings three points below the issuing company, mainly since CoCo coupons 
can be cancelled. Avdjiev et al. (2013) show that the biggest credit bureaus do not allow 
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credit rating to surpass BBB+, and that many will not make any assessment of the instrument. 
This creates difficulties with regard to building a solid investor depth, since institutional 
investors often have no mandates to invest in objects below the specified credit ratings 
(Avdjiev et al., 2013). In addition, such investors often cannot be faced with the risk of 
conversion to shares. 
 
There are also worries that investors in CoCos are driven by need for higher interest returns in 
a world dominated by low interest rates. Several contributors to literature also embrace 
uncertainty regarding investors’ ability to assess risk within CoCos. Hence, Delivorias (2016), 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) and Zombirt (2015) problematize that investors underestimate 
the possibility of conversion since it is a low-probability outcome, similar to tail-events. On 
the other side, Avdjiev et al. (2015) conclude that investors are aware of the risk embedded 
with conversion, and that they are willing to take the additional risk. This was found by 
measuring the credit spreads for credit default swaps (CDS) connected to other debt 
instruments from the same issuer, in the time before and after issuing CoCos. The study 
proved a significant decrease in the banks’ CDS spread when the CoCos were issued, 
implying that credit risk was reduced.  
 
Avdjiev et al. (2015) also show that the effect on credit risk was different depending on the 
mechanism of conversion, where the effect of principal write-down was the strongest. The 
effect on stock price had two implications: for CoCos with write-down the effect on stock 
price was negative for low triggers, but became significantly positive for high triggers. For 
CoCos with conversion to shares, the effect was significantly negative independent of the 
trigger level. Recent research by the same contributors gave same results as these mentioned 
effects (Avdjiev et al., 2017). 
 
The abovementioned results are intuitive since existing shareholders welcome CoCos with 
write-down mechanism and high trigger, as they share downside risk with debt investors. At 
the same time, issuances with conversion to shares face dilution risk, which might negatively 
influence stock price. The results indicate that investors anticipate a high probability of loss 
with conversion, and that CoCos are perceived as a risky investment (Avdjiev et al., 2015). 
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Modelling Contingent Convertible Bonds 
 
The remainder of this thesis is focused on CoCo issuances with Core Equity Tier 1 trigger and 
conversion to equity or principal write-down. Thus, issuances with market based and pure 
PONV triggers are not considered. Pricing CoCos have proved to be a complicated task as 
there is no unique way to handle these instruments. However, several contributors have, as 
outlined throughout the next sections, proposed models aimed at modelling CoCos with the 
abovementioned characteristics. Central contributors are Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011), 
Corcuera et al. (2013), Spiegeleer et al. (2017) and Pennachi (2010). 
 
The pricing methods are highly dependent on structuring factors such as loss-absorbing and 
conversion properties. In addition, parameters of the specific CoCo issue related to coupon 
payment, maturity and volatility are important. The hybrid nature of CoCos increases the 
pricing complexity since they are possible to price from both equity- and credit point of view. 
The most prominent models consist of structural and derivative methods, where the derivative 
methods are divided into equity and credit models. In the following sections, these approaches 
are explored and evaluated based on applicability and underlying assumptions, aimed at 
addressing RQ2.   
 
4.1 Derivative Methods 
 
4.1.1 Credit Derivatives 
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) introduced credit derivatives as a CoCo pricing method with 
regard to fixed-income derivations. Serjantov (2011) has a similar proposition, but this is not 
covered in detail in this thesis. Cheridito & Xu (2015) further developed credit derivatives by 
introducing pricing based on CDS spreads. Next, the initial model from Spiegeleer & 





The main intuition of credit derivatives pricing method is closely related to CoCos conversion 
features aimed at reflecting financial distress. Thus, the pricing problem seeks to reveal the 
extra yield needed to accept the risk of a loss. It is based on a reduced form methodology 
known as intensity-based credit modeling, whereas the default intensity and recovery rate are 
calculated. Duffie & Singleton (2003) cover this methodology in further detail. In the case of 
CoCos, the default intensity is denoted the trigger intensity 𝜆Trigger. The recovery rate is 𝑅 
upon conversion, and the price of the CoCo bond is thus assumed to be strongly related to a 
bank’s financial health and default probability. When default occurs, the investor face a loss 
equal to (1 − 𝑅) × 𝑁, with 𝑁 being the face value of the bond. At the point of the default, the 
investor expects to recover a proportion of face value. By using this relationship Spiegeleer & 
Schoutens (2011) state that the following formula determines the credit spread on CoCos, 
using a rule of thumb: 
 
𝐶𝑆CoCo = (1 − 𝑅) × 𝜆Trigger                                                                           (3) 
 
 
Equation (3) expresses an easy way to calculate the value of a CoCo bond by adding the 
continuous interest rate to the credit spread obtained. The approximation found using this 
rule-of-thumb method therefore expresses the total yield demanded. To obtain values for 
𝜆Trigger and 𝑅, one must use the following relations:  
 
𝑅 =  
𝑆∗
𝐶𝑝
                                                                        (4) 
 
Equation (4) illustrates the impact that conversion price 𝐶𝑝, and 𝑆
∗ the moment that the bond 
is converted into shares has, on the value of CoCos. It is easy to see that for increased 
conversion price a higher yield is required. Also, the effect of trigger intensity yields room for 
interpretation as presented in Equation (5). 
 
𝜆Trigger = − log(1−𝑝
∗)




The trigger intensity is determined by 𝑝∗, the probability of hitting the trigger and time to 
maturity 𝑇. Equation (6) is a formula used in barrier option pricing from the Black and 
Scholes framework, presented by Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011). It models the probability 
for a stock price breaching stock price trigger level 𝑆∗ sometime during the CoCo lifetime. In 
general 𝑁(𝑥) is the probability for a random variable 𝑋, taking a value less than 𝑥, as shown 
in (7), under assumption that the random variable is normally distributed. Hence, we got the 
following relations: 
 


















)                                (6) 
 
𝑁(𝑥) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑋 ≤ 𝑥)                                                       (7) 
 
Where, 




𝑞 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 
𝑟 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝜎 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑇 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 
𝑆 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
 
The trigger itself is defined as the accounting Core Equity Tier 1 measure. Instead of 
modeling CET1 directly, Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) link this accounting trigger to stock 
prices. When Core Equity Tier 1 falls below a predefined level a corresponding stock price 
barrier 𝑆∗ could replace it, capturing the equivalent effect, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Linking accounting CET1 trigger to stock price trigger level. 
 
Under derivative methods stock prices are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion 
(GMB), which has the quality of constant volatility and a continuous path. In reality, Taylor 
(2005) among others, highlight that stock prices follow a Leptokurtic distribution with fatter 
tails and a higher peak. In addition, the link between the stock price barrier 𝑆∗ and CET1 ratio 
might be a theoretical flaw since the co-movement between stock price and Core Equity Tier 
1 lack empirical significance. The credit derivatives method is easy to use, but may not be 
rooted in reality. In order to enhance the model Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) suggest using 
a more complex process such as Lévy or Variance Gamma to explain stock price movement.  
 
4.1.2 Equity Derivatives 
 
Equity derivatives derive from the risk-neutral valuation associated with options pricing 
(Black & Scholes, 1973), stating that in general, value of financial assets is the expected 
future payoff discounted at the risk-free interest rate. Based on a generalized version of the 
formula proposed by McDonald (2011), the price of CoCo can be found in Equation (8), 
under the assumption that a bank cannot default before conversion. Here, 𝜏 denotes the breach 
of a trigger. The first part of the equation shows the value of coupons with a spread, 𝜆, and 
face value, 𝐹. The second part denotes the payoff at a time,  𝜏 = (0, 𝑇), where the payoff 
either equals stock price (𝑆𝜏) times the conversion ratio (𝐶𝑟), if conversion happen, and 𝐹 if 
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not. Moreover, 𝜏 is determined by the trigger, and the associated stock price, 𝑆, is crucial to 
the value upon conversion.  
 
𝑉CoCo = 𝐸𝑄 [∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡(𝑟 − 𝜆)𝐹𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒−𝑟𝑡(𝑆𝜏𝐶𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑟 ≠ 𝑇,   𝐹 𝑖𝑓 𝑟 = 𝑇)
𝜏 
0
]                  (8) 
 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) proposed the equity derivatives approach with the additional 
underlying assumption that the accounting trigger is linked to a stock price level. This method 
is aimed toward CoCo issues with conversion into stocks. However, a similar method can be 
used to price issuances with write-down mechanism. Such an approach is covered in 
Spiegeleer et al. (2017). Equity derivatives price CoCos in light of barrier options, using 
knock-in forwards and binary down-in options.  
 
A barrier option value is dependent on whether the underlying asset breaches a specific level 
during a certain time period (Hull, 2015). Here, the knock-in forward is a kind of barrier 
option that comes into existence when the asset price reaches the stated barrier. Further, the 
binary-down-in is an option where the payoff is path-independent and occurs based on 
whether the asset is above or below the trigger level (Hull, 2015). Hence the binary feature, 
i.e. 1 or 0, ensure payoff if the option is in the money or out-the-money. A CoCo position is 
thus regarded as a long position in 𝐶𝑟 shares that are knocked-in when the trigger occur. The 
main intuition of this method is to replicate the cash flow of CoCo investments using a 
portfolio of equity derivatives. The pricing formula proposed by Spiegeleer & Schoutens 
(2011) is:  
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑖𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑠) −  ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛_𝐼𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠   (9) 
 
Equation (9) can be broken down into three parts: corporate bond, knock-in forwards and 
binary-down-in options. First, the value of a regular corporate bond is easily found by 
calculating the present value of its cash flows. Next, the effect of the trigger event is 
replicated using knock-in forwards. If a trigger event occurs, the bond is converted into 
forwards, which is a simplification of the real conversion event into shares. Finally, a binary 
down-in option position is used to cancel the effect of lost coupons. Coupons are only 
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received when the trigger event is not a fact, thus BDI options are completely offsetting 
coupon payments if the trigger is breached. The different parts of the pricing formula are 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶                                                                                                                (10) 
𝐴 = 𝑁 exp(−𝑟𝑇) +  ∑ 𝑐𝑖 exp(−𝑟𝑡𝑖)
𝐾
𝑖=1                                                                           (11)  
        𝐵 = 𝐶𝑟 × [𝑆 exp(−𝑞𝑇)(𝑆
∗/𝑆)2𝜆𝑁(𝑦1) − 𝐾 exp (−𝑟𝑇)(𝑆
∗/𝑆)2𝜆−2𝑁(𝑦1 − 𝜎√𝑇) −
                  𝐾 exp(−𝑟𝑇) 𝑁(−𝑥1 +  𝜎√𝑇 ) + 𝑆 exp(−𝑞𝑇) 𝑁(−𝑥1)]                                        (12) 
      𝐶 =  −𝛼 ∑ 𝑐𝑖 exp(−𝑟𝑡𝑖) [𝑁(−𝑥1𝑖 +  𝜎√𝑡𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1 + (𝑆
∗/𝑆)2𝜆−2 𝑁(𝑦1𝑖 −  𝜎√𝑡𝑖)]             (13) 
 
Several parameters must be obtained before calculating CoCo value in the equity derivatives 
pricing Equation (10). Here 𝐾 is equal to, 𝐶𝑝, the conversion price and 𝐶𝑟 is the conversion 
ratio. The parameters 𝐾, 𝐶𝑟, 𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑥1𝑖, 𝑦1𝑖 and 𝜆 are given by almost identical variables as 
for credit derivatives, and consists of: 
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𝑞 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 
𝑟 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝜎 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑇 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 
𝑆 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
 
All equations and parameters derived from the pricing Equation (10) is also found in 
Rubenstein & Reiner (1991). Moreover, the price of the CoCo is equal to the corporate bond 
(A) calculated using a risk free interest rate, plus the value of the knock-in forwards (B). The 
sum of the binary-down-in options is subtracted, capturing the effect of lost coupons 𝐶𝑖 upon 
the trigger event. Indeed, for every 𝐶𝑖 in Equation (13) there is a matching BDI option with 
exactly corresponding maturity to the maturity date 𝑡𝑖 for every coupon payment. Hence, the 
sum of the BDI options lowers the CoCo price.   
 
The equity derivative pricing model proposed by Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) yields a 
closed form solution, which provides applicability and computational straightforwardness. An 
obvious flaw of the pricing model is the fact that CoCo investors receive shares and not 
forwards. This flaw might be substantial when the trigger event happens long before the final 
expiration date. Consequently, a difference would occur if the converted shares pay dividends. 
However, Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) argue that under the reasonable assumption that 
dividend payout after a trigger event is going to be low or nonexistent, the barrier option 
technique is a generally well-accepted model. However, like credit derivatives, this model 
exhibits difficulties in term of realistic assumptions regarding the link between stock price and 






4.1.3 Introducing Smile Conform Dynamics   
 
Corcuera et al. (2013) extend the equity derivatives approach by proposing a model that 
embodies more realistic dynamics of stock price movements. In their proposition, risky asset 
dynamics are introduced through a smile conform model, which is the exponential Lévy 
process incorporating jumps and fat-tail distributions. The specific Lévy process used is a 𝛽 −
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎. While outside the scope of this thesis, a decomposition of this process is 
found in Kuznetsov et al. (2012). The risk-neutral stock price process expressed as 
exponential 𝛽 − 𝑉𝐺 process can be formulated as: 
 
 𝑆𝑡 =  𝑆0𝑒
(𝑟−𝑞)𝑡 exp(𝑋𝑡)
𝐸[exp (𝑋𝑡)]
,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑆0 > 0                                           (14) 
 
In Equation (14), 𝑟 is the risk-free rate and 𝑞 is the dividend yield. In general, Lévy processes 
have naturally built-in fatter tails than geometric Brownian motion, thus they also capture 
volatility smiles better. CoCo is an instrument with substantial tail-risk, therefore Corcuera et 
al. (2013) argue that Lévy processes are better suited for describing its price dynamics. 
Pricing CoCo bonds with Lévy processes follow somewhat the same logic application as in 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011). Indeed, the first step of the pricing process (A) is identical to 
Equation (11) under the equity derivatives method. The rest proceed as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝛽−𝑉𝐺 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶                                                                                        (15) 
𝐵 = 𝐶𝑟 × exp(−𝑟𝑇) × 𝐸[(𝑆𝑇 − 𝐾)𝟏{𝑖𝑛𝑓0≤𝑡≤𝑇𝑆𝑡<𝑆∗}]                              (16) 
𝐶 =  − ∑ 𝑐𝑖 exp(−𝑟𝑡𝑖) 𝐸[𝟏{𝑖𝑛𝑓0≤𝑡≤𝑡𝑖𝑆𝑡<𝑆
∗}
𝑘
𝑖=1 ]                                         (17) 
 
Expression (16) is a simplification since it does not regard the aspect of time to conversion 
within CoCos. Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011) argue, however, that the impact of this 
simplification is negligible since the company is in distress when conversion is taking place, 
making it natural to stop paying dividends. It is possible to obtain numerical solution to this 
pricing problem using a Monte Carlo simulation technique based on the randomized law of 
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infimum called Wiener-Hopf factorization (Kuznetsov et al., 2011). This specific method 
provides an efficient simulation of the abovementioned process, making it very well-suited for 
the task. The basic algorithm for the Wiener-Hopf Monte Carlo simulation is the following, 






𝑖=1 𝑒𝑖(1) → 𝑡     𝑎𝑠  𝑛 ↑  ∞                                                      (18) 
 
The relation in (18) follows from the strong law of large numbers. Corcuera et al. (2013) 
outline the Wiener-Hopf Monte Carlo simulation as an alternative to straightforward Monte 
Carlo random walk approximation. They also highlight the well-documented fact that 
straightforward Monte Carlo simulation might induce numerical errors into the distribution. 
The Wiener-Hopf method solves this problem by sampling from the law of (𝑋𝑔, ?̄?𝑔), where 𝑔 
is random time with distribution concentrated arbitrarily around 𝑡, depending on the chosen 
algorithm. Also, we have that 𝑋 is the chosen Lévy process and X̄  the arithmetic mean. For a 
sufficiently large 𝑛 in Equation (18), Kuznetsov et al. (2011) proved the suitable 
approximation to be:     
 










∈  𝑑𝑦]                                                  (19) 
 
Introducing CoCo pricing under the 𝛽 − 𝑉𝐺 process comes at the cost of reduced form 
solution, making Monte Carlo simulation a necessity. Corcuera et al. (2013) conclude that it 
better captures the nature of CoCo compared to the model employed by Spiegeleer & 
Schoutens (2011), albeit with increased complexity in modelling and computational features. 
However, CoCo pricing with smile conform dynamics is calibrated using CDS data, 
something that might not be optimal, as Wilkens & Bethke (2014) found other drivers to be of 





4.1.4 Implicit CET1 volatility 
 
Spiegeleer et al. (2017) developed new insight that resides on the early-stage credit and equity 
derivative methods, focused on issuances with full write-down features. Their findings 
highlight that CoCos can be perceived as a derivative of the Core Equity Tier 1 level. Also, 
they proved that CoCo spreads are identical at a significant level for issuances made by the 
same financial institution with corresponding triggers. Thus, indicating that the market 
attaches different probabilities for loss to occur for different banks’. The credit spread is 
found by using Equations (3) and (5). Since CoCos with full write-down have no recovery 
rate, the credit spread is equal to the trigger intensity, as stated in Equation (20). Furthermore, 
distance to the trigger was introduced as a measure of the relationship between CET1 ratio 
and trigger condition expressed as in (21). 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 =  −
log (1−𝑝∗)
𝑇
                                                               (20) 
 
𝐷𝑇 =  
𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟
                                                                  (21) 
 
Spiegeleer et al. (2017) proved the distance to trigger 𝐷𝑇, to be the intrinsic value of a CoCo 
bond, similar to deep-in-the-money options. The market value of an option deep-in the money 
is higher the more the option is in the money. However, notice that unlike for equity 
derivatives with conversion to shares, a binary-down-and-out is used rather than down-in 
options. Thus, the payoff is maintained or written down when the asset price breaches the 
barrier level (Hull, 2015). Clearly, the binary-down-and-out option is more appropriate for 
pricing full write-down CoCos since it captures the true conversion mechanism. By modelling 
the CET1 ratio as a continuous geometric Brownian motion without drift and using a similar 
pricing formula as in equity derivatives Equation (10), pricing formulae for such CoCos are 





𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒−𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 = 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 (𝑍𝐶) + ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛_𝐴𝑛𝑑_𝑂𝑢𝑡_𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝐶𝑝𝑛)    
(22) 
Where, 
𝑍𝐶 = 𝑁 exp(−𝑟𝑇) × (1 − 𝑝∗)                                                                                          (23) 
𝐶𝑝𝑛 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑖 exp (−𝑟𝑇𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1 × [𝜙 (𝑥𝑖 −  𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑇√𝑇𝑖) − 𝐷𝑇𝜙(𝑦𝑖 −  𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑇√𝑇𝑖)]                   (24) 
 
The parameters of this pricing method are essentially the same as in Equation (10). In 
addition, 𝑝∗ and 𝐷𝑇 is introduced, where 𝑝∗ captures the probability that the trigger occurs, 
similar to credit derivatives. From Equation (22) it is possible to derive implied CET1 
volatility, and from implied CET1 volatility the adjusted distance to the trigger can be found. 
Spiegeleer et al. (2017) were able to show that the implied CET1 volatility and the adjusted 
trigger to distance are more significant for attributing risk than CoCo spreads. Hence, the risk 
embedded can be decomposed into cancellation risk, i.e. the risk of facing cancelled coupon 
payments, and the risk of facing loss due to a PONV trigger. Indeed, implied CET1 volatility 
also yields new interpretations in CoCos with different contract features, e.g. Tier 1 and Tier 
2, coinciding with expected dynamics from option theory. The implementation of implied 
CET1 volatility might enhance CoCo pricing for market practitioners, as well as providing 
new interpretations of risk.     
 
4.2 Structural Models 
 
The structural approach is modeled where assets and liabilities are expressed as stochastic 
processes. Most issued CoCos have conversion with accounting trigger, therefore the use of a 
balance sheet as the main price driver contributes to a fundamental economic view. When 
modelling the value of assets and liabilities, assets less liabilities is representing the capital of 
the financial institution. Under the general Merton (1974) structural approach, default is 
considered to happen when the value of assets falls below liabilities, which is a realistic 
assumption. Based on Merton (1974), several contributors have proposed pricing methods 
with a structural approach. Among the contributors are Pennachi (2010), Albul et al. (2010), 
Madan & Schoutens (2011) and Glasserman & Behzad (2010). All have similar features, but 




Albul et al. (2010) search for the optimal capital structure and are investigating risk 
incentives. Madan & Schoutens (2011) introduced CoCo pricing using conic finance, while 
Glasserman & Behzad (2010) modelled contingent capital with a feature of partial and on-
going conversion in order to maintain a minimum capital level. However, Wilkens & Bethke 
(2014) indicate that Pennachi has the most prominent structural model regarding pricing, 
making it worthy of a closer look.  
 
4.2.1 Pennachi  
 
Pennachi (2010) proposed a structural model with the goal of finding the yield that CoCo 
investors require, under a Merton (1974) credit risk framework. The most important qualities 
introduced by Pennachi are allowing for jumps in the bank’s asset returns, dynamics of short-
term deposits, stochastic interest rates and mean-reverting capital ratio.  
 
In this model, the individual bank issuing the CoCo has a given capital structure consisting of 
short-term deposits, bonds and common equity. Assets are invested into loan portfolios, 
financial securities and off-balance sheet positions. The return on these assets are determined 
by a mixed jump-diffusion process, allowing jumps to occur. This is supposed to capture the 
dynamics of times with financial distress. Furthermore, Pennachi (2010) uses market values to 
determine the rate of return on assets, which deviates from the Merton (1974) method where 
observed balance sheet values is used.  
 
Deposits are assumed to have short maturity with continuous interest payment, thus they are 
senior claim liabilities and function as short-term funding of the bank. Since interest rates are 
paid continuously, Pennachi (2010) allows the bank’s total capital to increase only when net 
growth in new deposits occurs. This makes sense since empirical studies, e.g. Adrian & Shin 
(2010), show that banks have target capital ratios and deposit growth in times of excess 
capital. In other words, there is no stochastic movement for deposits. Furthermore, this makes 
deposit growth positively correlated to the bank’s asset-to-deposit ratio (capital ratio). The 
















]                                               (25) 
 
In Equation (25), 𝑔 is a positive constant, and the second part inside the brackets represents 
the target asset-to-deposit ratio. When the actual ratio is larger than the targeted ratio, the 
bank issues a positive amount of new deposit. If, however, the targeted ratio exceeds the 
actual ratio, the bank will make gradual adjustments by shrinking its balance sheet. To 
accommodate the trigger condition, Pennachi (2010) proposed a fixed assets-to-deposit ratio, 
expressed as (?̄? =  
𝐴
𝐷
 ). The stochastic process of this trigger ratio is then found by combining 
the processes of assets and deposits using the Monte Carlo simulation introduced by Boyle 
(1977). Moreover, it is possible to derive the CoCo price from associated martingale pricing, 
with formulas identical to those of derivative methods.  
 
The Pennachi model introduces some improvements to the literature on CoCo pricing, since it 
considers both the numerator and denominator of the trigger condition. The model also allows 
for continuous conversion, not just quarterly conversion, which is more realistic. However, 
since Pennachi (2010) uses market values in the trigger relation, it means that trigger ratio and 
stock price will be fully correlated. This occurs since there is no stochastic movement of 
deposits, thus both the trigger and stock price are only dependent on the asset process. Since 
the co-movement of capital ratios and stock prices is not fully correlated in reality, it 
introduces a flaw. In addition, Wilkens & Bethke (2014) highlight that the performance of 









4.3 Assessment of Models  
 
When evaluating the existing CoCo pricing models, it is clear that they all have both strengths 
and weaknesses. All have proved to provide somewhat accurate pricing of CoCos, but differ 
widely in terms of applicability. Wilkens & Bethke (2014) examine the suitability of 
structural, credit- and equity derivatives, and highlight three important criteria. First, the 
pricing model should capture the nature of CoCos, e.g. capital ratios and trigger mechanisms. 
Second, the model must incorporate the most significant price drivers of the CoCo bond. 
Finally, the model should be based upon observable market parameters such as share prices, 
bond prices, equity options and CDS prices.  
 
In light of the abovementioned criteria, Wilkens & Bethke (2014) indicate that equity 
derivatives are the most promising as a model for pricing CoCos. Several arguments point in 
this direction, as equity derivatives have parameters that are observable and are based on 
stock price as the main CoCo price driver. Indeed, both Spiegeleer et al. (2017) and Wilkens 
& Bethke (2014) found stock price to be of higher significance as CoCo price drivers than 
CDS spreads. Although not the main scope of this thesis, Wilkens & Bethke (2014) also 
conclude that equity derivatives are the most suited for market practitioners when it comes to 
hedging and risk management performance.  
 
Table 1, provided by Wilkens & Bethke (2014), gives a useful overview of the different 
parameters required for each of the distinctive models, and shows the usage and the source of 
the data obtained. Equity derivatives stand out as less complex and more applicable than the 
structural model introduced by Pennachi, whereas credit derivatives lack ground in reality 
since they use a rule-of-thumb estimation. Hence there are strong indications that equity 
derivative methods, including smile conform dynamics or implicit CET1 volatility, might be 
the way to proceed regarding pricing and exploring the dynamics of these hybrids. However, 
the main challenge with equity derivatives is to accommodate a significant relation between 
stock price and Core Equity Tier 1, in order to model the stock price trigger correctly. As a 




Table 1: Overview of parameters, data usage and data source for all models reviewed.  
Symbol Description Usage Source 
All models    
𝑇 CoCo maturity Static Term sheet 
𝑁 CoCo nominal Static Term sheet 
𝑐 CoCo coupon rate Static Term sheet 
𝑓 CoCo coupon frequency Static Term sheet 
𝑟 Risk-free interest rate Dynamic Market data 
Structural model    
𝐴 Asset value of issuer  Dynamic  Market data 
𝐷 Deposit value of issuer Dynamic  Balance sheet 
𝑝 CoCo bond conversion factor Static  Term sheet 
𝑥𝑐 Critical asset-to-deposit ratio Static Term sheet 
?̄? Target asset-to-deposits ratio Static  Balance sheet 
𝑔 Mean-reversion speed in asset return  Static Expert judgement 
𝜎 Volatility of asset return process Fitting Expert judgement 
𝜆 Jump intensity in asset return Fitting Expert judgement 
𝜇𝑦 Mean jump size in asset return Fitting Expert judgement 
𝜎𝑦 Jump volatility in asset return Fitting Expert judgement 
Equity derivative    
𝑆 Stock price of issuer Dynamic  Market data 
𝑆∗ Stock price trigger level Fitting Market data 
𝐶𝑝 Conversion price Static Term sheet 
𝑞 Dividend yield Dynamic Market data 
𝑣 Implied volatility Dynamic Market data 
Credit derivative    
𝑠𝑑 Spread for default Dynamic Market data 
𝑠𝑐 Spread for trigger  Fitting Market data 
𝑅𝑑 Recovery at default Static Expert judgement 
𝑅𝑐 Recovery at conversion Static Expert judgement 
𝜌 Copula correlation for trigger Static Expert judgement 
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Empirical Methodology  
 
When addressing the issue of pricing CoCos this thesis builds on the methods presented in the 
previous section. Mainly equity derivatives are used for empirical consideration, as that is the 
most prominent method and it reflects the true characteristics of the bonds considered. 
Additionally, equity derivatives present an opportunity to improve the stock price trigger 
relation in a Black-Scholes approach by using forward looking 𝛽 values to obtain stock price 
trigger levels. Hence, the pricing model proposed does not rely on the simplifying assumption 
of fixed historic correlation between Core Equity Tier 1 and stock prices.  
 
5.1 Analytical Approach 
 
As there is a lack of evidence for historical significant correlation, a modest attempt at 
enhancing the link between CET1 ratio and stock price is proposed. This is done by 
introducing scenario-based 𝛽 values to find the stock price trigger level. Intuitively, 𝛽 
displays the movement of the CET1 ratio compared to the stock price. Since 𝛽 is a lagged 
indicator, using historical correlations in calculations is misleading, especially when financial 
distress has been absent during the period in question. Thus, scenario 𝛽 values are used as a 
proxy to capture the possible effect of times with financial distress, in an ex-ante manner.  
 
The new idea resides on the fact that correlations in good times usually are different from 
times with financial distress. Rossi & Malavasi (2016) found the average 𝛽 between Core 
Equity Tier 1 and return on assets ranging from 0.90 to 1.47 in the time period of 2007-2013. 
They also found that 𝛽 was higher in the subsequent years of the subprime mortgage crisis, 
somewhat contrary to what is expected. A possible explanation for the rise in 𝛽 might be that 
Core Equity Tier 1 is affected by both CET1 capital and RWA, creating a self-reinforcing 






The proposed analytical derivation is based on Equation (26) with 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝑆𝑇 as unknown 
parameters. Here 𝛼 is a constant capturing the outperformance factor of the Core Equity Tier 
1, including the risk-free interest rate. Furthermore, 𝛽 is the CAPM 𝛽 embedding the 
systematic risk of the asset compared to the benchmark. Although, CAPM 𝛽 lacks empirical 
significance in predicting asset returns (Fama & French, 2004), it is employed as a new 
assumption of the CoCo pricing model to find the trigger relation. As CAPM 𝛽 is calculated 
from the covariance between return of asset and benchmark, and divided by the variance of 
the benchmark, it does imply that some correlation implicitly is assumed. However, this 
correlation is not obtained from lagged historical measures. 
 
𝑆𝑇 is the associated stock price level when the CET1 level is lower than the predefined 
threshold. 𝐶𝐸𝑇10 is the observed CET1 level at time 0, 𝐶𝐸𝑇1𝑇 is the accounting CET1 
trigger level, and 𝑆0 is the observed stock price at time 0. Equation (26) relies on a Black and 
Scholes risk-neutral valuation framework (Black & Scholes, 1973), where constant volatility, 
constant interest rate and no dividends are important assumptions.  
 




ln(𝑆𝑇) = ln(𝑆0) − (ln(𝐶𝐸𝑇10) − ln(𝐶𝐸𝑇1𝑇) − 𝛼) /𝛽                               (27) 
 
 
Solving for 𝑆𝑇: 
 










Equation (28) yields the analytical solution to obtain 𝑆𝑇, the stock price trigger level. In order 
to estimate 𝑆𝑇, values for 𝛼 and 𝛽 must be inserted based on economic intuition since they 
cannot be observed from historical data. Using scenarios with different 𝛽 values therefore 
presents a new approach of finding 𝑆𝑇. The stock price trigger level is thus dependent of the 
chosen 𝛽 and 𝛼 levels, as well as the observed CET1 ratio, the CET1 trigger ratio and stock 
price. In addition, throughout the pricing model, 𝛼 is assumed to be zero. Consequently, the 
outperformance factor is identical to the risk-free rate, which in reality is close to zero. 
 
5.2 Scenarios and Assumptions 
 
The main assumptions of the pricing model are that a bank cannot default before conversion, 
and that conversion only happens when the predefined trigger level is breached. However, one 
could argue that when CoCos are designed with a low trigger, typically that of 5.125 percent, 
regulators would enforce conversion by the PONV trigger prior to breach of the CET1 trigger 
level (Spiegeleer et al., 2017). Even though this PONV trigger level is difficult to price with 
accuracy, it can provide useful interpretation regarding risk assessment when comparing 
theoretical price to observed CoCo price.  
 
Furthermore, in this thesis CoCo bonds are priced under the assumption of three different 𝛽 
values. In accordance with existing research that states that a higher correlation and 𝛽 for 
times with financial distress, the values are expected to lie between 0.5 and 1.5 (Rossi & 
Malavasi, 2016). Testing for such a big interval provide extremal cases, and should provide a 
useful proxy to capture the future 𝛽 values between CET1 and stock prices. The different 
scenarios are defined as follows:  
 
• Scenario 1: 𝛽 = 0.5 
• Scenario 2: 𝛽 = 1 





5.3 Calibrating the Pricing Model 
 
Using the above 𝛽 values and assuming that 𝛼 is equal to zero, three different stock price 
trigger levels are found. Table 2 shows the parameters used and the 𝑆𝑇 estimates for all three 
scenarios, using Equation (28).  
 
Table 2: Parameters and trigger level estimations. 
𝑪𝑬𝑻𝟏𝟎         16.3% 
𝑪𝑬𝑻𝟏𝑻           5.125% 
𝑺𝟎          160.56 
𝜶  0 
Scenario 1: 𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟓                            𝑆𝑇 = 15.86 
                   Scenario 2: 𝜷 = 𝟏      𝑆𝑇 = 50.46 
Scenario 3: 𝜷 = 𝟏. 𝟓  𝑆𝑇 = 74.21 
  
In order to calculate CoCo prices by the equity derivatives approach the statistical software R 
is employed for computational applicability. The package fExoticOptions can be used to 
calculate the price of a binary down-and-out asset-or-nothing option based on the relevant 
parameters (Wuertz & Setz, 2017). These parameters and formulas are the same as provided 
by Rubenstein & Reiner (1991), which essentially form the basis for the equity derivatives 
approach proposed by Spiegeleer et al. (2017). 
 
After 𝑆𝑇 several other parameters must be obtained. These consist of stock price 𝑆0, exercise 
price 𝑋, time to maturity, annualized interest rate 𝑟, cost of carry 𝑏, cash or nothing 𝐾 and 
volatility of the underlying asset 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎. However, the parameters cash or nothing 𝐾, exercise 
price 𝑋 and cost of carry 𝑏 are set equal to zero due to the characteristics of the instrument.   
 
The stock price 𝑆0 is obtained from the last observed DNB price on the day of estimation. The 
volatility of the underlying asset is found by calculating the standard deviation using daily 
historical DNB adjusted stock price data from 1992:Q3 to 2017:Q3. Here the observed value 
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for 𝑆0 is 160.56 while the estimated 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 for the period was 38 per cent. Using constant 
volatility based on historical standard deviations is obviously a simplification, as volatility is 
stochastic and unobservable. Although, outside the scope of this thesis, one could use a 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model, in order to 
capture the clustering and mean-reverting tendencies of long-term volatility (Hull, 2015). 
Alternatively, the model could be calibrated with implied volatility, i.e. market’s forward 
looking opinion of volatility obtained from option prices (Taylor, 2005). Instead of using 
implied volatility, the sensitivity in different volatility levels is tested through the sensitivity 
analysis, to address discussion of the volatility used.    
 
Time to maturity is found by assuming redemption at the first call date of the instrument. 
Although the instrument is perpetual by definition, Spiegeleer et al. (2017), Murphy (2008) 
and Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2014) argue that it is common practice for issuers of Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 instruments to call at the first possible call date. Hence the case of CoCo issuance could 
be subject to similar incentives and priced thereafter. 
 
Damodaran (2008) emphasizes the importance of using a risk-free rate nominated in same 
currency as the future cash flows of the company. The Norwegian 10-year government bond 
at 1.64 per-cent is therefore used as a parameter for annualized risk-free rate 𝑟 and for 
discounting the zero coupon bond (NBIM, 2018). Furthermore, 𝑝∗, the probability that a 
trigger will occur, is needed to calculate the value of zero coupon bond. The probability of a 
trigger occurring is found from the parameters 𝐷𝑇, distance from trigger, annualized standard 
deviation of CET1 ratio, time to maturity 𝑇 and 𝜇, the expected value, as presented in 
Equation (29): 
 
𝑝∗ = 1 −  𝜑 (
log(𝐷𝑇)+ 𝜇𝑇
𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑇1√𝑇
) + 𝐷𝑇𝜑 (−
log(𝐷𝑇)−𝜇𝑇
𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑇1√𝑇






Equation (29) is almost identical to Equation (6) in credit derivatives, with the same 
assumption of a normal distributed random variable. A further explanation of the former is 
provided in appendices C. The probability that a trigger will occur estimates the likelihood of 
CET1 ratio breaching the trigger point during the CoCo lifetime. Consequently, when 
discounting par value with 100 years to capture the perpetual effect and subtracting the 






























The issuing bank to be considered for empirical pricing is DNB, the largest Norwegian bank. 
DNB issued two CoCo bonds at the Oslo stock exchange in 2015 and 2016, respectively. 
Both issuances are Additional Tier 1 bonds with embedded full write-down structure. As 
shown by Avdjiev et al. (2017) in figure B.1 from appendices B, there has been a structural 
shift toward issuing CoCos with write-down mechanism the latest years, supporting the need 
to further explore such bonds.  
 
As previously mentioned, the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis led to capital build up 
in response to increased regulatory capital requirements. The target CET1 ratio implemented 
by Basel III is gradually being phased-in, thus a positive drift in the CET1 ratio is expected to 
be observed during the last decade. This must be carefully regarded when linking Core Equity 




The dataset contains daily observations of the DNB adjusted stock price from 1992:Q3 to 
2017:Q3. DNB’s quarterly reported Core Equity Tier 1 from 2009:Q1 to 2017:Q3 are 
provided from company filings. Focusing on the last decade yields the most up-to-date 
perspective, with the correct standards for measuring Core Equity Tier 1 ratios applied. The 
adjusted stock price data is subsequently transformed into quarterly data from 2009:Q1 to 
2017:Q3, in order to match the corresponding CET1 observations. The daily DNB adjusted 
stock price data from 1992 is used to calibrate the volatility. In addition, all historic data 
regarding DNB CoCo issuance at the Oslo stock exchange is collected. Within the dataset for 
CoCo issuance coupon rate, open price, high price, low price, last traded price, official 
volume and unofficial volume are included. All data except Core Equity Tier 1 is collected 





6.2 Stock Price Trigger Level  
 
Modeling trigger contingency by linking stock price to the associated Core Equity Tier 1 
barrier is based on the idea that such a relation can be a proxy for the actual trigger condition. 
However, stock price is a function of expected future earnings, thus including much more 
information than just default risk (Taylor, 2005). Consequently, the co-movement between the 
two variables cannot be fully correlated. Figure 4 presents the reported Core Equity Tier 1 
ratio and DNB adjusted stock price level, with the CET1 ratio ranging from 6 percent in 
2009:Q1 to 16.3 percent in 2017:Q3, while the adjusted stock price ranged from NOK 22 to 
160 in the same time period.  
 
 
Figure 4: Core Equity Tier 1 ratio and DNB adjusted stock price level.  
 
At first glance there seems to be a positive relation between the reported Core Equity Tier 1 
ratio and DNB stock price movements. However, measuring correlation from levels might 
give misleading results due to random stochastic trends. In other words, calculating 
correlations from non-stationary variables, might induce spurious results (Hill et al., 2012). 
Hence, variables must be first-order differenced in order to be made stationary. The quarterly 
log CET1 changes and adjusted stock price return yields a Pearson correlation coefficient of 
0.027 with p-value equal to 0.8793, i.e. not significantly different from zero. Figure 5 
illustrates the insignificant correlation between the returns, showing that there is no fixed co-
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movement based on historic data. This finding coincides with the results provided by 
Veiteberg et al. (2012), showing that for a sample of 18 G-SIBs the correlation was 
insignificant with a Pearson coefficient equal to 0.035.  
 
 
Figure 5: Scatterplot of log CET1 change and log stock price return. 
 
To find a generalized pattern between CET1 ratio and DNB stock prices, samples of banks of 
similar size should be considered. Therefore, analyzing domestic-SIBs across countries to 
obtain more recent results for CET1 and stock returns is a possibility. This, however, could 
induce biased results since all membership nations can impose different implementation of 
Core Equity Tier 1 ratio from a regulatory perspective (BCBS, 2010). Also, finding samples 
of such banks under the same legislation is close to impossible, since DNB is the only listed 
D-SIB bank with headquarters in Norway.  
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of log quarterly change for CET1 ratio and daily returns for 
DNB adjusted stock price. The red line illustrates the normal distribution while the black line 
represents the observed distribution. It is apparent that both are drawn from a non-normal 
distribution. DNB stock price returns have both higher kurtosis and fatter-tails compared to 
the normal distribution (Taylor, 2005). Core Equity Tier 1 changes display severe problems 
44 
 
with the more extreme outliers, making the empirical distribution far from normal. Spiegeleer 
et al. (2017) highlight that skewness often is observed with equity, something that is also 
observed with CET1 changes, as expected. By testing for normality using Shapiro-Wilk test, 
we are able to reject the null hypothesis that distributions are normal, with p-values lower 
than 𝛼 = 0.05 in both cases.  
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of log CET1 change and log adjusted daily stock price return. 
 
Finding a generalized pattern between CET1 ratio and stock price proves difficult using 
historical data. Obviously, this makes it difficult to price CoCo bonds, as the majority of 
issuances have trigger contingency equal to accounting CET1. Moreover, obtaining the 
correct stock price trigger level is impossible based on such historical data. Therefore, the 
analytical approach to solve the link between CET1 ratio and stock price is emphasized. Next, 
the stock price trigger level is put into the equity derivatives pricing method to find the fair 






6.3 Pricing DNB CoCos 
 
DNB issued Additional Tier 1 CoCos in 2015 and 2016. Table 3 displays the most significant 
details of each instrument. Both issuances were priced at a par price of 100 on the issuance 
date. The 2015 issuance has coupons equal to 3-month NIBOR plus a margin of 3.25 percent 
(DNB, 2015), while the 2016 issuance has 3-month NIBOR plus margin of 5.25 percent 
(DNB, 2016). Both issuances have an accounting Core Equity Tier 1 trigger ratio of 5.125 
percent, with full write-down if trigger occurs. The first call dates for the instruments are 
February 2020 and June 2021 respectively, which serve as the maturity dates. As empirical 
pricing is commenced, the pricing date is set to September 29, 2017 due the lack of Core 
Equity Tier 1 ratios that are reported later.  
 
Table 3: Issuance details.  
DNB AT1 2015 DNB AT1 2016 
Name             15/PERP FRN C HYBRID  Name             16/PERP FRN C HYBRID 
ISIN               NO0010730708 ISIN               NO0010767957 
Ticker            DNBA59 Ticker            DNBA60 
Issue Date      2015.02.27 Issue Date      2016.06.30 
CET1 date     2017.09.29 CET1 date     2017.09.29 
Coupon          4.61 Coupon          6.29  
Trigger          5.125 Trigger          5.125 
Outstanding  2.150 mill NOK  Outstanding  1.400 mill NOK 










6.3.1 AT1 2015 
 
The first step in the equity derivatives pricing model for write-down CoCos is to calculate the 
price of a zero coupon bond using Equation (23). Second, the price of a binary-down-and-out 
option is calculated using Equation (24). For practical purposes both are solved in Rstudio 
using programming language R.  
 
The value of a zero coupon bond: 
 𝑍𝐶 = 13.51 
 
The price of binary-down-and-out options: 
To ensure that the correct option type is priced, the binary-down-out asset-or-nothing from 
Wuertz & Setz (2017) is used. This captures the true characteristics of the CoCo bond, where 
either the payout of the asset is maintained or the whole value is written down if the price of 
the underlying stock breaches the barrier level. A further explanation of the different option 
types is found at Wuertz & Setz (2017) and Rubenstein & Reiner (1991). Note that in Table 4 
and 5, the stock price trigger level is denoted as 𝐻. 
 
Table 4: Input parameters and option price estimation for DNB AT1 2015. 
Parameters 𝑺 𝑿 𝑯 𝑲 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒓 𝒃 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒎𝒂 Price 
Scenario 1 160.56 0 15.86 0 2.5 1.64% 0 38% 154.10 
Scenario 2 160.56 0 50.46 0 2.5 1.64% 0 38% 149.59 
Scenario 3 160.56 0 74.21 0 2.5 1.64% 0 38% 133.82 
 
The corresponding CoCo prices are found by adding the value of the zero coupon bond (ZC) 
and the option price for all three trigger levels. Consequently three prices are found due to 
scenarios in which there are different stock price trigger levels. The value of the zero coupon 
bond is the same in all scenarios since the only different factor is the trigger level. Hence the 
AT1 2015 CoCo prices are calculated 167.61, 163.10 and 147.33, ranged from the lowest to 
the highest trigger level.  
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6.3.2 AT1 2016 
 
By employing step-by-step method as in the previous subsection, the price of the AT1 2016 
CoCo is found by changing the input value for time to maturity and calculating new 
probability of breaching the trigger 𝑝∗. This provides new estimates for both the zero coupon 
bond (ZC) and the three option prices.  
 
The value of zero coupon bond: 
𝑍𝐶 = 11.65 
 
The price of binary-down-and-out options: 
Table 5: Input parameters and option price estimation for DNB AT1 2016. 
Parameters 𝑺 𝑿 𝑯 𝑲 𝑻𝒊𝒎𝒆 𝒓 𝒃 𝑺𝒊𝒈𝒎𝒂 Price 
Scenario 1 160.56 0 15.86 0 3.9 1.64% 0 38% 150.52 
Scenario 2 160.56 0 50.46 0 3.9 1.64% 0 38% 140.70 
Scenario 3 160.56 0 74.21 0 3.9 1.64% 0 38% 120.65 
 
The estimated CoCo prices for the AT1 2016 bond are 162.17, 152.35 and 132.3 ranged from 
the lowest to the highest trigger level. In the next section, a discussion and sensitivity analysis 
is presented to evaluate assumptions and the results from the empirical part. New link 
between CET1 and stock price trigger level will be interpreted. A sensitivity analysis is also 
provided to get a grasp of the most important price drivers of CoCo bonds. Subsequently, the 








Discussion and Sensitivity  
 
The market priced DNB’s issuances at 101.15 and 107.87 on the nearest closing day. Table 6 
displays the observed and estimated prices for different trigger levels. The pricing model 
points to underpricing of both CoCo issuances for all three scenarios, as the theoretical prices 
are higher than the observed market prices. However, the theoretical price of 132.30 for the 
AT1 2016 bond is not far from its true value of 107.87, leaving room for interesting 
interpretations.  
 
Spiegeleer et al. (2017) highlight that underpricing is likely to occur for issuances with a large 
distance to trigger (𝐷𝑇) since it represents the intrinsic value of a deep-in-the-money option. 
Consequently, shorter time to maturity should yield a lower probability of hitting the trigger. 
The estimated probability of hitting trigger 𝑝∗ confirms this, being 31.25 percent for the AT1 
2015 bond and 40.71 percent for the 2016 bond. These findings coincide with the dynamics of 
the price from the AT1 2015 bond, which is significantly underpriced for all scenarios.   
 
Table 6: Observed and estimated CoCo prices 
Issuance Observed price 𝑺𝑻 = 𝟏𝟓. 𝟖𝟔 𝑺𝑻 = 𝟓𝟎. 𝟒𝟔 𝑺𝑻 = 𝟕𝟒. 𝟐𝟏 
AT1 2015 101.15 167.61 163.10 147.33 
AT1 2016 107.87 162.17 152.35 132.30 
 
 
7.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this subsection several sensitivity tests are conducted to see the effects of varying some 
inputs, while keeping others constant. The purpose of these tests is to reveal the sensitivity of 
the primary input parameters and their importance in calculating the CoCo price. The 
parameters considered are the risk-free rate, time to maturity, volatility (𝜎) and stock price 
trigger level. Allowing these parameters to vary can lead to increased knowledge about the 
dynamics of the bond and indicate which assumptions require the most attention. Thus 
exploring dynamics might fill the gap between the theoretical prices found and the observed 
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market prices. First, the interest rate sensitivity is considered, to address the discussion of 
which interest rate to use as a proxy for the risk-free rate. 
 
Table 7: CoCo price when changing the risk-free rate. 
𝒓𝒇 0.5 % 1 % 1.64 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 
AT1 2015  179.43 161.39 147.33 142.10 132.92 127.51 
AT1 2016 162.13 145.61 132.30 127.09 117.50 111.21 
 
Table 7 shows that the market price of the AT1 2016 bond implies a risk-free rate just above 4 
percent. However, for the AT1 2015 bond the implied risk-free rate is much higher as the 
calculated CoCo price is 127.51 for a 4 percent risk-free rate, when keeping everything else 
constant. These results further imply that the discrepancy between market and theoretical 
prices is not mainly due to the interest rate chosen in the pricing model. Although, the chosen 
interest rate might be too low, a risk-free rate above 4 percent seems unreasonably high when 
it is possible to invest in less safe 10-year bonds with a 2.9 percent interest rate (DNB, 2018). 
Surely nobody would invest in the latter if the risk-free rate was 4 percent. 
 
Figure 7 and 8 shows the effect of varied risk-free rates on the CoCo price for all three trigger 
levels. An increased interest rate is shown to decrease the price of the bond since it provides a 
higher alternative risk-free investment. When keeping the other parameters constant the bond 
therefore has a lower value at higher interest rates. At a 5 percent interest rate the AT1 2015 
bond is still heavily underpriced at all trigger levels. However, the AT1 2016 bond is quite 
close to its observed value of 107.87 at a 5 per cent risk-free rate and a stock price trigger 
level of 74.21.  
 
Figure 7 and 8 also shows the differences that occurs for the respective trigger levels, where 
the isolated effect of increased stock price trigger level decreases the CoCo value. When time 
to maturity is longer, the probability of breaching the trigger is higher. This is especially true 
for the stock price trigger level of 74.21, since it is closer to the observed DNB stock price. 
This effect is similar to the intrinsic value of options, as shown in Spiegeleer et al. (2017). For 
the 2015 bond the difference in price at different trigger levels is almost constant, since it has 
50 
 
less time to redemption. This means that there is a lower probability of hitting the trigger and 
therefore the bond has higher intrinsic value. The difference in price between triggers is 
increasing for the 2016 bond as its future value is more uncertain. Here a higher stock price 
trigger facilitates to lower 𝐷𝑇 and lower the intrinsic value. Furthermore, it is worth noticing 
that the AT1 2016 is less sensitive to increased risk-free rates than AT1 2015, likely due to 
the different coupon rate embedded. 
 
Figure 7: AT1 2015 price for different trigger levels and varied risk-free rate. 
 




Figure 9 presents the CoCo price sensitivity for a range of stock price trigger levels in both 
bonds. If the correlation is equal to zero as found from historical data, the stock price trigger 
level would be equal to the observed stock price. As shown, then the price of the AT1 2015 
and the AT1 2016 bond would be unreasonable low, equal to 14.50 and 12.51, respectively. 
Obviously, using historical correlation to determine the trigger level is farfetched, as the 
prices deviate heavily from what is realistic. Additionally, one can see that in order to obtain 
theoretical prices equal to the observed, the AT1 2015 trigger level is equal to 110 and the 
AT1 2016 is equal to 95. This imply a fall in stock price of about 31.5 and 41 percent, which 
also might be too low.  
 
Figure 9: CoCo price sensitivity for different stock price trigger levels. 
 
Figure 10 shows the sensitivity analysis of varied volatility levels. Here CoCo prices are 
plotted as a function of volatility, ranging from 10 to 80 percent. The red line represents the 
AT1 2015, while AT1 2016 shown in black. The prices of both bonds are decreasing with 
increased volatility. This occurs since higher volatility means higher probability of hitting the 
trigger for a given stock price trigger level. Consequently, the estimated bond prices are closer 





The theoretical price is equal to the market price for a volatility of 70 percent with the AT1 
2016 bond. For the AT1 2015 bond, however, a volatility above 80 percent still indicates that 
underpricing is present. Comparing these findings to the 38 percent volatility used in the 
pricing model, it show that market participants are likely to attach higher risk in both CoCos. 
These findings coincides with volatility smile dynamics observed with options deep-in or 
deep-out the money (Hull, 2015). Thus, the market might assume a higher probability of 
hitting the trigger, and a higher stock price trigger levels than emphasized in the pricing 
model. If market participants assume a higher stock price trigger level, the option becomes 
more out-the-money and therefore less valuable.  
 
Figure 10: Sensitivity when varying volatility for AT1 2015 and AT1 2016. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the AT1 2015 bond prices’ sensitivity toward changes in time to 
maturity. The maturities tested are from 0 to 10 years. As it can be seen, the bond price is 
decreasing with decreasing speed for increased time to maturity, all else constant. In other 
words, the bond price converges to par value at a larger time to maturity. Only the 2015 issue 




Figure 11: AT1 2015 price for different maturities. 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that no single parameter alone can explain the discrepancy 
between theoretical and observed price. The results outlined through this section strongly 
indicate that both the volatility and maturity used in the pricing model is too simplistic. This 
has two important implications: first, the assumption of call on first call date might be 
unrealistic, and second, the market assumes higher overall risk with the instrument. 
Additionally, as briefly discussed, the risk-free rate might be a bit low. The combined effect 
of increasing these parameters contributes to a lower price for both CoCos.  
 
7.2 How Well Does the Pricing Model Perform? 
 
The pricing model employed in this thesis is based upon simplistic assumptions such as 
constant volatility, constant interest rates, no dividends and that the stock price trigger level 
function as a proxy for the true Core Equity Tier 1 trigger barrier. It is also assumed that a 
bank cannot default prior to conversion, and that conversion happens only when the trigger 
barrier is breached. Overall, the pricing model indicates significant underpricing for both 
instruments. However, it is unclear whether the underpricing occurs due to the simplistic 
assumptions of the pricing model, mispricing in the market or a combination of both. 
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Although, in Scenario 3 using 𝛽 = 1.5, the estimated price is fairly close to the market value 
of the AT1 2016 bond.  
 
Moreover, when pricing CoCos in an equity derivative framework there is widespread 
practice to assume a stock price fall of around 50 percent to reach the stock price trigger level 
(Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011). When implementing the new 𝛽-link outlined in this thesis, 
the stock price trigger level in Scenario 3 is 74.21, indicating a stock price fall of about 53 
percent. Hence, Scenario 3 stands out as the most realistic. The other scenarios are of more 
extreme nature, yielding stock price fall of 68 and 90 percent, respectively. It is safe to 
assume that regulators would impose PONV trigger long before this stock price level to 
mitigate fear of default and prevent bank-runs. 
 
By looking at the risk in both CoCo prices, one can compare the credit spreads provided in 
Table 8. The credit spreads are calculated using Equation (20). The estimates are 149 and 134 
basis points, reflecting the low risk associated with the underlying company. The credit 
spreads found are, as expected, fairly identical for both issuances. However, counterintuitive 
as it might seem, the credit spread for the AT1 2015 issue is higher, even though it has a 
lower probability of breaching the trigger.  
 
Table 8: Credit spread and probability of hitting trigger 𝑝∗ 
Issuance 𝒑∗ Credit spread 
AT1 2015 31.25 % 149 bps 
AT1 2016 40.71 % 134 bps 
 
The discrepancy between the observed and theoretical prices of both bonds may be explained 
by several factors. These factors include coupon cancelling risk, extension risk and PONV 
trigger risk. Spiegeleer et al. (2017) found coupon cancelling risk to represent around 9 
percent of the CoCo bond value for Credit Suisse’s full write-down AT1 bond issued in 2013. 
They also simulated the PONV trigger for a sample of CoCo issuances made by European 
banks, and estimated that the average PONV trigger was equal to 9.37 percent. This implies 
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that regulators impose write-down far above the 5.125 per cent Core Equity Tier 1 trigger. 
Both the risk of coupon cancelling and PONV trigger reduce the value of the CoCo bond as 
they increase the volatility parameter (𝜎) and implied stock price trigger level. The theoretical 
pricing model is thus expected to deliver a price above the market since it does not allow for 
coupon cancelling and write-down before the CET1 trigger is breached.  
 
The presence of extension risk might also influence the CoCo bond value. Spiegeleer & 
Schoutens (2014) highlight that in the years prior to 2008, coupon step-up was a common 
practice to ensure that debt instruments were called at first call date. However, from the new 
rules implemented in January 2013, banning coupon step-up for AT1 CoCos, an extension 
risk is introduced (BCBS, 2013). As for risk of coupon cancelling and PONV triggers, the 
presence of extension risk reduces the value of the CoCo bond since it increases the parameter 
of time to maturity. However, this is not considered in the pricing model, as redemption at 
first call date is assumed in line with traditional AT1 and Tier 2 instruments.    
 
The pricing model employed in this thesis emphasizes applicability and simplicity for both 
issuers and market practitioners. It seeks to find a more accurate relation between the CET1 
trigger and stock price trigger level by employing scenarios through 𝛽 relations, instead of 
assuming a fixed correlation between the two based on historical movements. This shifts the 
trigger relation from lagged historical movements, to an ex-ante, forward looking approach. 
As the main focus is at enhancing the trigger relation, the pricing model does not aim to 
employ the more advanced process dynamics, e.g. mean-reverting volatility and tail-risk. 
 
In order to enhance the model with regard to volatility and tail-risk, more advanced dynamics 
could be implemented by using Lévy processes as outlined in Section 4.1.3, or introducing 
more complex stochastic volatility, e.g. through GARCH models. However, this would shift 
the pricing model from a closed form solution to simulation based, making it more 
complicated and time consuming from a computational point of view. Moreover, the model 
could be calibrated with the implicit CET1 volatility as proposed by Spiegeleer et al. (2017) 
to reveal the true dynamics of the CET1 level. The pricing model could furthermore consider 
extension risk, cancellation risk and PONV trigger risk as briefly discussed in this section. 
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Clearly more research is required to find the appropriate 𝛽 values between CET1 trigger level 
and stock price. However, the current results present an improvement compared to the 
ordinary equity derivatives model, since the pricing model does not assume a one-on-one 
correlation between Core Equity Tier 1 and stock price. Additionally, the scenario analysis 
might function as a useful guideline in searching for the optimal 𝛽 relation. 
 
7.3 The Regulatory Debate 
 
CoCos have potential to mitigate future financial distress by functioning as a loss-absorbing 
instrument that restores a bank’s capital, without spending taxpayers’ money. This coincides 
with the increased regulatory capital requirements implemented by Basel III. Although, 
Admati et al. (2013) and Sundaresan & Wang (2010) argue that saved tax deductions for the 
bank is a cost to society. Furthermore, if constructed properly, CoCos can reduce the need for 
bailouts, reduce default risk and reduce the possibility of market manipulation. However, 
there are challenges that needs to be addressed by regulators in ensuring that CoCos function 
as intended. 
 
The complex nature and low standardization of CoCos make it hard for investors to compare 
issuances. Thus, pricing is a difficult aspect. Regulators also leave investors uncertain by not 
providing standardized trigger and conversion mechanisms. Both are critical in deciding the 
incentives for investors and the loss-absorbing ability of the bond. There is particularly 
widespread agreement that structuring trigger mechanisms is the most important aspect in 
order to ensure loss-absorbing ability (Sundaresan & Wang, 2010; Corcuera et al., 2013; 
Spiegeleer & Schoutens, 2011).  
 
CoCos might be constructed with accounting, regulatory, market and multivariable triggers, 
with conversion to shares or write-down. Where conversion might be structured with different 
fraction and price, e.g. fully, partly or conversion with floor. A combination of accounting 
trigger and regulatory PONV trigger is most often observed in the market. This launches an 
important discussion, since regulators do not provide any clear guidance on how to interpret 
the PONV trigger (Spiegeleer et al., 2017). However, as emphasized in last section, investors 
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are likely to take into account the uncertainty regarding PONV, but with lack of precision. 
This might increase the overall risk assumed with CoCos.  
 
Consequently, CoCos current trigger structure might be suboptimal with respect to the critical 
factors in design of trigger, as proposed by Spiegeleer & Schoutens (2011). Here the main 
problem is: firstly, not being sufficiently transparent and updated, as Core Equity Tier 1 ratio 
is not observable with daily changes. Second, since the conversion process must be known, 
regulatory PONV intervention is not optimal. Finally, all information regarding structure and 
drivers behind a potential conversion is not public information, as it should be.    
 
CoCos are still in an early phase as a financial security, but two important events adds 
empirical knowledge to the discussion of the instrument’s suitability. Investors in Deutsche 
Bank AT1 bond started a panic sale due to speculations of cancelling coupons in February 
2016, which caused CoCo prices and stock prices to fall dramatically. At the same time, the 
credit default spreads of Deutsche Bank increased due to this fear, increasing the risk 
associated with the bank. Delivorias (2016) argues that this panic was caused by fear of 
coupon cancelling, not fear of conversion. In this case, the structure of CoCos, by allowing 
coupon cancelling, created financial distress as investors feared lost coupon payments.  
 
Second, the rescue of Banco Popular in June 2017 stands as a warning to CoCo investors. 
This was the first time losses occurred in the AT1 market. Banco Popular’s CoCos were 
converted to shares that had zero value, while leaving senior bondholders untouched 
(Euromoney, 2017). Banco Popular was declared the state of non-viability since regulators 
feared a bank-run due to large amounts of deposit withdrawals. None of the bank’s 
outstanding AT1 bonds had ever missed coupon payments, which according to the structure 
of CoCos should occur before write-down or conversion. The incident of Banco Popular 
clearly was an issue of liquidity problems and not of regulatory capital. Before this event, 
Banco Popular reported a Core Equity Tier 1 of 10.02 percent in 2017:Q1, way above the 
CoCo trigger at 5.125 percent, thus supporting the conclusion of liquidity issues. 
Consequently, the conversion of Banco Polpulars’s CoCos proves that regulators do not 




The abovementioned empirical knowledge underscore the importance of an ongoing 
regulatory discussion, to search for optimal structure and features. Questions that presents 
themselves are if banks’ really has become safer in light of the increased regulatory capital, 
and if the potential CoCo issuance is big enough to have mitigating effect on default risk. 
Interestingly, Spiegeleer et al. (2017) found that although banks’ has increased their Core 
Equity Tier 1 ratios, they are perceived as more risky, as the CET1 volatility increased from 
14.1 to 22.4 per cent in the recent years. Admati et al. (2013) early introduced concerns that 
CoCo are too complex and have insufficient loss absorbing capacity. However, the latter is 
still rather untested from an empirical point of view.  
 
The unexpected dynamics observed during the events related to Deutsche Bank and Banco 
Popular illustrates the risk of a changed regulatory landscape. Further, there is an ongoing 
debate that Tier 2 CoCos might be substituted with new securities under Minimum 
Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) and Total Loss Absorbing 
Capacity (TLAC) regulations in order to enhance the liquidity of banks (Avdjiev et al., 2015). 
This uncertainty about changed future regulatory requirements adds to the uncertainty faced 
by the investors and issuers. It might also imply that market practitioners have focused too 
much on the impact of Core Equity Tier 1 triggers compared to the other risks associated with 
the instrument. Consequently, whether financial engineering or more restrictions on structure 
are the future response in designing CoCos, is dilemmas that financial regulators and 













Contingent convertible bonds have emerged as a promising hybrid going-concern loss-
absorbing instrument under the Basel III regulation, seeking to enhance the quality and 
amount of regulatory capital. Therefore, CoCos might replace subordinated debt as loss-
absorbing regulatory capital, as it transfers risk from tax-payers to investors of CoCo bonds. 
Additionally, if CoCos are constructed properly, they contribute in creating more robust banks 
for times with financial distress. However, as CoCos are instruments with high complexity 
and varying structures, pricing becomes a challenging and important topic. 
 
Well-established CoCo pricing models consist of structural, credit and equity derivatives 
methods. Equity derivatives are found to be most suitable as they are less complex and are 
based upon observable market parameters and incorporate the most important price drivers. 
As for all CoCo pricing models with accounting CET1 trigger, equity derivatives solve the 
trigger contingency by assuming high co-movement between Core Equity Tier 1 and stock 
price. However, making such an assumption induces a flaw since no significant correlation is 
found empirically. 
 
This thesis makes a modest attempt at solving the trigger relation analytically by employing 
CAPM 𝛽 values between Core Equity Tier 1 and stock price in different scenarios. The 𝛽 
relation provides a realistic estimate of the stock price trigger level compared to previous 
literature. According to the best estimate, the fair values of both DNB CoCos are higher than 
the market price, indicating that the pricing model fails to incorporate some value-decreasing 
property or that mispricing has occurred due to limited understanding of its dynamics. The 
results from the pricing model does however introduce an improvement to existing models as 
stock price trigger level is found without assuming a one-on-one correlation. The price 
discrepancy can be divided into two main categories, namely (1) shortcomings of the pricing 





The thesis presents several shortcomings of the pricing model that add to explain the 
discrepancy between theoretical and observed prices. First, the simplifying assumptions 
regarding maturity at first call date and constant volatility, might be unrealistic. The 
sensitivity analysis suggests that both maturity and volatility are value-decreasing factors that 
could be larger in reality. Moreover, the model does not incorporate coupon cancellation risk, 
extension risk and PONV trigger risk. These risks are likely incorporated by sophisticated 
investors, and thereby reduces the CoCo value.  
 
Investors in CoCos may not be provided with sufficient information about pricing, dynamics 
and structure of the bonds, as emphasized throughout this thesis. This might increase investors 
perception of risk, causing higher expected probability for loss to occur and higher expected 
stock price trigger levels. Such misinterpretations can lead to reinforced risk itself, as 
observed in the incident with fear of coupon cancelling in Deutsche Bank. Consequently, 
there is clearly need for ongoing assessment and improvement of CoCos structure. If these 
hybrids are not structured optimally, they might impose high uncertainty for both investors 
and issuers. Therefore, commencing important challenges for policymakers and regulators to 
ensure that the loss-absorbing mechanism work as intended, in order to enhance robustness of 
banks.  
 
In order to improve the pricing model, more advanced dynamics are reasonable to 
incorporate. Further research should focus on extending the 𝛽 relation in a more advanced 
settings by employing Lévy processes to capture the tail-risk included with CoCos. In 
addition, the pricing model should incorporate the clustering and mean-reverting tendency of 
volatility. The introduction of coupon cancelling risk, extension risk and PONV trigger risk 
are also interesting topics for future research, as they undoubtedly have impact on the CoCo 
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A     Distribution of CoCo Issuance 
 
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of CoCo issuances by nationality and currencies, denoted in 
USD billions in the time period 2009-2015. The currency distribution shows that Euro, 




Figure A.1: Distribution of CoCo issuance between nations and by currency 















B     Evolution of CoCo Issuance 
 
Figure B.1 displays the total CoCo issuances made from 2009 to the middle of 2015. The 
figure especially highlights a structural shift from issuances with conversion to principal 
write-down mechanism. Also, the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 categorization is 




Figure B.1: Total CoCo Issuance in USD billions from 2009-2015. 















C     Equity Derivatives: Probability of Breaching The Trigger 
 
In the Spiegeleer et al. (2017) approach for full write-down CoCos, the probability of 
breaching the trigger is based on the same Black-Scholes formula as in credit derivatives 
method. The main difference is the introduction of 𝐷𝑇. Consequently, here 𝑝∗ is the 
likelihood of the stock price breaching the trigger during the lifetime of the CoCo bond. Thus, 
in general 𝜑(𝑥) is the probability of a random variable 𝑋, taking a value less than 𝑥, under the 
assumption that the random variable has a normal distribution. Hence, we got the following 
relations:  
 
                             𝑝∗ = 1 −  𝜑 (
log(𝐷𝑇)+ 𝜇𝑇
𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑇1√𝑇









        𝑇 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝐶𝑜 









 𝜎𝐶𝐸𝑇1 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐸𝑇1 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
 
